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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD W. BRANDT and LEONA 
J. BRANDT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
SPRINGVILLE BANKING COMPANY 
a Utah corporation, F. C. 
PACKARD and HOWARD C. 
MAYCOCK, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 9128 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
The only factual evidence requested by and submitted 
to the lower court are the alleged facts set forth in De-
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fendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R 27), Defend-
ants' Affidavit in support thereof ( R 29), Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint ( R 21) and Plaintiff's Affidavit Oppos-
ing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R 36). 
The court did not take any testimony of witnesses as to 
any factual matter. 
Plaintiffs and their family have been patrons and 
depositors of the Springville Banking Company from ap· 
proximately 1949 to approximately 1958; that during said 
time plaintiffs were personal friends of said defendants 
F. C. Packard and Howard C. Maycock, President and 
Cashier respectively of said Springville Banking Company; 
that many times during said period plaintiffs have con-
sulted with said officers of said bank on financial matters 
pertaining to their personal affairs; that during said time 
defendant Maycock was the religious teacher and advisor 
of plaintiffs. ( R 42) . 
Plaintiffs were contacted by said Waldo Jackson and 
said officers of the Springville Banking Company to put 
new money into the Jackson Sales & Service Company; that 
plaintiffs did not want to become involved in Jackson Sales 
& Service business but were interested in organizing a farm 
implement corporation with said Waldo Jackson apart from 
Jackson Sales & Service. Later on Waldo Jackson and the 
above named defendants proposed that a new corporation 
be organized under the name of Stockman & Farmers Mart 
for the purpose of conducting the farm machinery business 
in which plaintiffs were to invest ·$10,000.00; Waldo Jackson 
was to invest in the new corporation by transferring to it, free 
of encumbrance, certain of the assets of the Jackson Sales 
& Service Co. The new corporation was organized by Glen 
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W. Sumsion, the regular attorney for said defendant bank 
at the request of and recommendation of Waldo Jackson 
and said defendants. 
That for plaintiffs to go through with their end of the 
deal it was necessary to borrow $10,000.00; that the above 
named defendants suggested that plaintiffs assign their 
equity in their home in Springville, Utah, to an aunt in Cali-
fornia to secure a $S,OOO.OO loan from her, and that plaintiff 
Howard M. Brandt take out a $5,000.00 policy of insurance 
on his life with his aunt as beneficiary; that the Santa 
Monica Branch of the Bank of America made an inquiry at 
the request of plaintiff's aunt of the Springville Banking 
Company as to the financial status of plaintiffs and one 
Waldo Jackson; that the Springville Banking Company 
through its president, D·efendant F. C. Packard, answered 
said inquiry recommending the loan and the financial in-
tegrity of plaintiffs and said Waldo Jackson. ( R 37, 50). 
Thereafter plaintiffs were successful in procuring the 
$5,000.00 loan from said aunt, which sum was deposited to 
the personal account of plaintiff Howard W. Brandt in the 
said Springville Banking Company. That said bank then 
loaned the plaintiffs an additional $5,000.00 upon their 
personal note and accepted as security for the payment of 
same the proceeds from a Salina real estate GOntract which 
was escrowed with the bank. This $5,000.00. was also 
deposited in the personal account of plaintiff Howard W. 
Brandt in the said Springville Banking Company .. 
Up to this point, neither Waldo Jackson, the Spring~ 
ville Banking Company, nor its officers F. C. Packard and 
Howard C. Maycock, had _disclosed to plaintiffs in any way 
what was to be done with the $10,000.00 plaintiffs ha-d hor-
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rowed for investment in the Stockman & Farmers Mart. That 
on or about March 2, 1955, ·plaintiffs met at the Springville 
Banking Company with the said Waldo Jackson and said 
defendant, Howard C. Maycock, cashier of the Springville 
Banking Company, for the purpose of completing the trans-
action with the Stockman & Farmers Mart. That at said time 
plaintiffs did not know that the Jackson Sales & Service Co. 
was indebted to the Springville Banking Company in the sum 
of .$45,000.00 or any other sum; that at said time plaintiffs 
did not know that the $10,000.00 they were putting into the 
Stockman & Farmers Mart was to be paid out to Jackson 
Sales & Service Co. and that said Jackson Sales & Service Co. 
was to immediately pay out said sum to s4id bank in partial 
satisfaction of its obligation to the Springville Banking Com-
pany; that neither Waldo Jackson nor any of the officers of 
said bank, each of whom well knew that Jackson Sales & 
Service Co. was so indebted, made any disclosure to plain-
tiffs of these facts. That at said meeting, defendant Howard 
C. Maycock directed that plaintiff Howard W. Brandt make 
his personal check of $10,000.00 to the Stockman & Farmers 
Mart in payment of stock he was to receive in said corpora· 
tion; that said $10,000.00 was to be applied by Stockman 
& Farmers Mart on the purchase price of the inventory of the 
Jackson Sales & Service Co. which had been taken and 
evaluated at $26,500.00. That subsequently, on or about 
June, 1958, affiant learned that said $10,000.00 was 
paid on the said 2nd day of March, 1955, to the defendant, 
Springville Banking Company, on an indebtedness owing by 
Jackson Sales & Service to the bank which was in the ap· 
proximate amount of .$41,194.79 and which was secured by 
a chattel mortgage in the sum of $45,000.00 on the personal 
property of the said Jackson Sales & Service Co., including 
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the inventory which was to be transferred to the Stockman & 
Farmers Mart by the said Jackson Sales & Service Co. Said 
chattel mortgage is the same chattel mortgage referred to in 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on file in said 
case. ( R. 39) Said chattel mortgage was filed of record 
with the County Recorder of Utah County on September 24, 
1949, as Entry #8708. 
That at said time, to-wit, March 2, 1955, Defendant 
Springville Banking Co. held said chattel mortgage given 
by Jackson Sales & Service to Defendant Springville Banking 
Co. for $45,000.00 on said inventory, fixtures and equip-
ment; that the unpaid balance on said chattel mortgage on 
March 2, 1955, was approximately $41,194.79; that plain-
tiffs at said time did not know of the existence of said chat-
tel mortgage, and they would not have entered into said new 
business of Stockman & Farmers Mart, nor invested 
$10,000.00 or any sum in said company if they had known 
of the existence of said chattel mortgage at said time; that 
plaintiffs did not discover or learn of the existence of said 
chattel mortgage until on or about June, 1958. ( R. 40) 
That said defendants, by reason of the relationship 
which existed between them and the plaintiffs, and by reason 
of plaintiff's placing confidence in them, and by reason of 
defendants' having superior knowledge of the facts, had a 
duty to speak and disclose to plaintiffs the existence of said 
chattel mortgage and the obligation it secured on the 2nd 
day of March, 1955, and subsequent thereto; that defendants 
remained silent and thereby deceitfully and· fraudulently 
concealed from plaintiffs the material fact of the existence 
of said chattel mortgage and the obligation of ·$41,194. 79 
until plaintiffs learned about the existence of said mortgage 
on or about June, 1958. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
Also at the conference at the bank above mentioned, 
Defendant Maycock credited the bank account of Stockman 
& Farmers Mart with $6,500.00, taking its promissory note 
for the same and specifically directing that this money be 
used to pay the debts of Jackson Sales & Service Co. and for 
no other purpose, which was done. 
Furthermore, in May 1955, Defendant Packard of the 
bank put the pressure on Waldo Jackson and plaintiffs to 
sell the inventory and assets of the Stockman & Farmers Mart 
in order that the bank's $6,500.00 obligation could be 
liquidated. In September, 1955, at the instance and demand 
of Defendants, Stockman & Farmers Mart did exchange its 
assets for a farm at Payson, Utah, owned by one E. A. 
Smithurst subject to a mortgage in the sum of approximately 
$6,7 51.23 ; the defendant bank presided throughout this 
Smithurst transaction; a short time later said farm was sold 
to John T. Martin and the net proceeds thereof in the sum 
of $4,300.00 was paid to said defendant bank upon said 
$6,500.00 loan. 
That said defendants and one Waldo Jackson concealed 
the plan which the above facts disclose to induce plaintiffs 
to borrow the ·$10,000.00 to invest in farm equipment sales 
business, but said defendants fraudulently concealed from 
plaintiffs the fact that said money was in reality to be used 
for the purpose of liquidating the obligation of the Jackson 
Sales & Service Co. to the Springville Banking Company; 
that the Springville Banking Company knew of and partici-
pated in the plan to induce plaintiffs to borrow and invest 
the $10,000.00 as aforesaid and conspired with the said 
Waldo Jackson to conceal from plaintiffs the fact that Jack-
son Sales & Service Co. owed said money to the bank; that 
the concealment of said material facts in connection with said 
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business transaction is actionable where there is a duty to 
speak; this duty to speak arises because of the confidential 
relationship existing between plaintiffs and defendants, 
which gives rise to an obligation to reveal all the facts in 
connection with the transaction and particularly the existence 
of the Springville Banking Company's chattel mortgage of 
$45,000.00, on which there was owing $41,194.79, covering 
the assets of Jackson Sales & Service Co., which assets were 
transferred by the Jackson Sales & Service Co. to Stock-
man & Farmers Mart; that the inventory of the assets and 
personal property so transferred as aforesaid had a reason-
able cash value of only $26,500.00; that if there had been 
a full disclosure to plaintiffs of the facts hereinabove set 
forth they would not have invested the sum of $10,000.00 
or any other sum into this enterprise and incurred the 
financial obligations incident to this bankrupt concern. 
Defendant Howard C. Maycock, cashier of said bank, 
falsely represented to plaintiffs that the ·$10,000 supplied 
by plaintiffs would be put into the business of the Stockman 
& Farmers Mart and another $:10,000 would be put into said 
business by Waldo Jackson; that the additional capital 
would make it a better business. That said defendant falsely 
represented that the obligations of the new corporation would 
be approximately $6,500 and the Stockman & Farmers Mart 
would pay this obligation. 
Deposition of Howard C. Maycock: (R. 42-43) 
"Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. Howard W. 
Brandt? 
"A. I am. 
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"Q. When did you first become acquainted with 
him? 
"A. At the time he purchased his home in 
Springville. 
"Q. Do you know when that was? 
"A. I would be guessing, but some time around 
1949, I think. 
"Q. Then for at least approximately 10 years or 
9 years you have been acquainted with Mr. Brandt? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. What has been the nature of your acquain-
tance with him? 
"A. The fact that he has been a customer of the 
bank, a depositor having a checking account there and 
also in connection with church affairs. I happen to 
be his ward teacher." 
* * * 
"Q. Were you acquainted with the business of 
Jackson Sales & Service as run by Mr. Waldo Jack-
son? 
"A. As he made deposits, yes. 
"Q. Didn't you talk to him about how business 
at that time was going and what obligations he had at 
this time? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Preceding the March 2nd date? 
"A. We felt an additional $10,000 in the busi-
ness would make it a better business and it would 
also give a new personality to it. We felt Brandt 
could add something to the business to make it bet-
ter. He came in as an active participant in the busi-
ness, he was not just an investor. 
"Q. He was going to work in the business? 
"A. And he did work. 
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"Q. He quit another job to work in the busi-
ness? 
"A. That is right. I guess he had another job. 
"Q. At that time, at the time that you were 
discussing this business with him (Brandt) and Mr. 
Waldo Jackson, the nature of this business, was any-
thing said about how much ownership each would 
have in the Stockman and Farmers Mart? 
"A. Each was supposed to have a half interest, 
$10,000 apiece. 
"Q. So, the $10,000 that Mr. Brandt put up by 
means of a check that I referred to here before, dated 
March 2nd, was what he put in that day? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And the deposit that you referred to her 
for the ·$650.00 plus the $9,350.00 is what Mr. Jack-
son put in the business? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. At that time they were going over the in-
ventory and this merchandise, did they discuss with 
you the amount of the obligations? You said some-
thing-it was being taken subject to the obligations? 
"A. My r.ecollection is that it was approximately 
$6,500 and Stockman & Farmers Mart would pay 
that obligation. 
"Q. To whatever creditors there were of Jackson 
Sales & Service, is that correct? 
"Yes, that is correct." 
* * * (R. 44) 
"Q. On the date of March 2, 1955, did you ad-
vise Mr. Howard W. Brandt that the bank had a 
chattel mortgage on the equipment as shown upon the 
chattel mortgage and the balance was some $40,-
000.00? 
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"A. I don't recall. 
"Q. When you say you don't recall, do you 
recall the conversation? 
"A. I don't know what I told him." 
* * * 
"Q. Do you have any reason that you know of 
not telling Mr. Brandt about the bank's loan to Mr. 
Jackson or Jackson Sales & Service for this $40 . 
0 ? ' 00.00. 
"A. I said I didn't tell him. I said I could not 
remember. 
"Q. You don't think you mentioned it to him? 
"A. N 0. 
"Q. Do you know of any reason? 
"A. No, I felt this was a separate corporation 
and had nothing to do with the other one, after the 
transfer of the physical assets." 
Waldo Jackson in his deposition testified that he did 
not nor did Jackson Sales & Service Co. invest any money in 
the Stockman & Farmers Mart; that the two checks of $650.00 
and $9,350.00 respectively, as testified to by Defendant 
Maycock, as above set forth, did not represent any cash con· 
tribution to the Stockman & Farmers Mart but were simply 
used as a matter of bookkeeping. The following testimony is 
taken from the deposition of Waldo I ackson ( R. 4 7-48) : 
"Q. Had you borrowed any money from the 
bank on Jackson Sales & Service? 
"A. Yes, I borrowed money from the banl{. 
"Q. Under the date of March 2, 1955, do you 
know how much you owed the bank? 
"A. $40,100.00 and some odd dollars. 
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"Q. Is that from your own recollection? 
"A. That is the note I paid off finally and that 
was the balance that was owing at the time the deal 
was set up with Mr. Brandt. 
"Q. Did you ever advise Mr. Brandt that this 
amount was due and owing to the bank? 
"A. No, because I didn't think it concerned 
him.'' (pages 6-7) 
* * * 
"Q. How much money did you invest in Stock-
man & Farmers Mart, you personally? 
"A. I didn't invest any, none. 
"Q. Did Jackson Sales & Service put anything 
into it? 
"A. How much did they put in? 
"Mr. Howard: Are you talking about money? 
"Mr. Conder Yes. 
"A. Money? None, then. . 
"Q. You heard the desposition of Mr. May-
cock referring to two checks shown and deposits 
for Jackson Sales & Service; one for $650.00 and one 
for $9,350.00? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you prepare such checks? 
"A. Yes, I prepared the checks. 
"Q. You say there was no money invested by 
Jackson Sales & Service? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Where did the money come from on these 
checks? 
"A. It was to satisfy the inventory transfer, 
the inventory in Stockman & Farmers Mart, it was 
just a fixture or instrument in your language, a fix-
ture in mine." 
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* * * 
"Q. Do you recall borrowing $6,500.00 from 
the bank? 
"A. Yes, I recall that. 
"Q. And signing a note? 
"A. I didn't sign a note. 
"Q. I show you the note here for $6,500.00 
which is signed by Mr. Brandt; did you authorize that 
loan for Stockman & Farmers Mart? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And had you signed anything In connec-
tion with this note with the bank? 
"A. Not that I recall." {page 15) 
Referring to said chattel mortgage, the President of the 
Defendant Bank testified in his deposition that said chattel 
mortgage covered all of the inventory and merchandise of 
Jackson Sales & Service; that said mortgage was not paid 
by 1955. (R 46) 
Waldo Jackson in his deposition testified he did not 
disclose to plaintiffs the amount due and owing defendant 
bank on said chattel mortgage in the sum of $40,100.00 and 
some odd dollars at the time the deal was set up with Mr. 
Brandt. (R 47) 
The lower court in his Memorandum Decision stated: 
(R 54) 
"The plaintiffs' case appears to be based on the 
making of, and losing an investment of $10,000 in a 
corporation known as the Stockman & Farmers Mart 
in reliance on the representation that the personal 
property transferred to the corporation was free from 
liens and encumbrances when in fact there was a 
chattel mortgage on such property, securing a note 
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to the defendant bank with an unpaid balance of 
$41,194.79. All particulars were known to the de-
fendants, none of whom disclosed the indebtedness or 
lien to plaintiffs at the time the plaintiffs discussed 
with defendants the making of, and arranged and 
made, the aforesaid investment. The corporation 
later failed and plaintiffs' investment. was lost." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS SET FORTH 
IN SECTION 78-12-26, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AND AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFFS DID NOT 
HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE EXISTENCE OF SAID CHATTEL MORTGAGE 
MORE THAN THREE YEARS PRIOR TO THE COM-
MENCEMENT OF SAID ACTION. 
II. 
THE DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT IN THE SUPPRES-
SION OF TRUTH, AS WELL AS BY POSITIVE STATE-
MENTS OF FALSEHOOD, WAS A SUBSTANTIAL FAC-
TOR IN CAUSING PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGE IN THE SUM 
OF $10,000.00, AND THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN SAID CASE. 
ARGUMENT 
As to Point I, plaintiffs' cause of action is not barred 
by the statute of limitations as set forth in Section 78-12-26, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.. Section 78-12-26, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, provides a three-year limitation on actions 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
set forth in said section. Subparagraph ( 3) reads as fol-
lows: 
" ( 3) An action for relief on the ground of 
fraud or mistake; but the cause of action in such case 
shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discov-
ery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting 
the fraud or mistake." 
In the case of SMITH VS. EDWARDS (1932) 
81 Utah 244, 17 P 2d 265, the court held: 
"Under the laws of Utah it is clear that the 
limitation does not begin to run until the facts con-
stituting the fraud are discovered. There is therefore 
a great deal said in these cases about what amounts 
to discovery. *** The question is, what constitutes 
a 'discovery' within the meaning of the statute? 
Mere constructive notice of the deed by reason of its 
being filed for record is not notice of the facts con-
stituting the fraud. *** 
To ascertain what constitutes 'a discovery of 
the facts constituting the fraud,' reference must be 
had to the principles of equity. ***Hence, in actions 
in equity, the rule was that the means of know ledge 
were equivalent to actual knowledge; that is, that a 
knowledge of fact which would have put an ordinarily 
prudent man upon inquiry which, if followed up, 
would have resulted in a discovery of the fraud, was 
equivalent to actual discovery." 
The Memorandum Decision of the lower court in grant-
ing Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment placed no 
credence in defendants' contention that plaintiffs' cause of 
action was barred by the statute of limitations. The allega-
tion in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint that they did not dis-
cover or learn of the existence of said chattel mortgage until 
on or about June, 1958 ( R 22-23) is controlling in absence 
of any evidence to the contrary. 
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POINT II. THE DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT IN THE 
SUPPRESSION OF TRUTH, AS WELL AS BY POSITIVE 
STATEMENTS OF FALSEHOOD, WAS A SUBSTANTIAL 
FACTOR IN CAUSING PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGE IN THE 
SUM OF $10,000.00, AND THE COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN SAID CAUSE. 
The following excerpts from the Law of Torts by Wil-
liam L. Prosser, 2nd Edition ( 1955) are pertinent in explan-
ation of the legal questions set forth in plaintiffs' Point II: 
"CAUSATION IN F:A:CT: (p. 218-223) 
"The defendant is not liable for the plaintiff's 
injury unless he has in fact caused it. Causation is a 
matter of what has in fact occurred. The fact of caus-
ation is essential to liability, but does not alone de-
termine it, since other considerations may prevent it 
although causation is established. 
"If the defendant's act or omission was a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about the result, it will be 
regarded as a cause in fact. Ordinarily it will be 
such a substantial factor if the 11esult would not have 
occurred without it. 
"The plaintiff is not required to establish the 
fact of causation with absolute certainty. It is suf-
ficient that he introduces evidence from which reason-
able men may conclude that it is more probabLe that 
the defendant's conduct was a cause than it was not. 
"An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of 
action for negligence, or for that matter for any other 
tort, is that there be some reasonable connection be-
tween the act or omission of the defendant and the 
damage which the plaintiff has suffered. This con-
nection usually is dealt with by the courts in terms of 
what is called "proximate cause," or "legal cause." 
There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law 
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which has called forth more disagreement, or upon 
which-the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. 
N:or, despite_.the manifold attempts .which have been 
mad~ Jo clarify the subject, is there. yet any general 
agreement as to the . proper approach. - Much of this 
confusion is due to the fact that no one problem is 
involved, .but a number of different. problems, which 
· are· not distinguished clearly, and that language ap-
propriate to a discussion of one is carried over to 
.east a shadow upon the others. 
"Proximate cause"-in itself an unforunate 
term-is merely the limitation which the courts have 
placed upon the actor's responsibility for the conse-
quence of his conduct. * * * 
"This limitation is sometimes, but rarely, one of 
the fact of causation. More often it is purely one of 
policy, not connected with questions of causation at 
all. If the defendant excavates a hole by the side of 
the road, and the plaintiff's runaway horse runs into 
it, it scarcely can be pretended that the hole was not 
a cause of the harm, and a very important one. If 
the defendant escapes responsibility, it is because the 
policy of the law does not require him to safeguard 
the plaintiff against such a risk. On the same basis, 
if the defendant drives through the state of New Jer-
sey at an excessive speed, and arrives in Philadelphia 
in time to be struck by lightning, his speed is a not un-
important cause of the accident, since without it he 
would not have been there in time; and if he is not 
. liable to his passenger, it is because in the eyes of the 
law his negligence did.· not extend to such a risk. The 
attempt to deal with such cases in the language of 
causation. can lead only to confusion. 
"The simplest and most obvious problem con-
nected with "proximate cause" is that of causation. 
Of all the questions involved, it is easiest to give an 
answer to that· which traditionally is regarded as most 
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difficult: has the conduct of the defendant caused 
the plaintiff's loss? This is a question of fact, and 
one on which any layman is quite as competent to sit 
in judgment as the most experienced court.· In the or-
dinary case, it is peculiarly for the jury. 
"Causation is a fact. ltJ is a matter of what has 
in fact occurred. A cause is a necessary antecedent: 
In a very practical sense the term embraces all things 
which have so far contributed to the result that with-
out them it would not have occurred. It covers not 
only positive acts and active physical forces, but also 
pre-existing passive conditions which have played a 
material part in bringing about the event. In par-
ticular, it covers the defendant's omissions as well as 
his acts. The failure to extingish a fire may be quite 
as important in causing the destruction of a building 
as setting it in the first place. The failure to fence a 
railway track may be a cause, and an important one, 
that a child is struck by a train. It is familiar law 
that if such omissions are culpable they will result in 
liability. 
*** 
"* * * A stabs C with a knife, and B fractures 
C' s skull with a rock; either would be fatal, and C 
dies from the effects of both. The defendant sets a 
fire, which merges with a fire from some other source; 
the combined fires burn the plaintiff's property, but 
either one would have done it alone. In such cases it 
is clear that each cause has played a part in the 
result, and it is also clear that neither can be ab-
solved from responsibility upon the ground that the 
harm would have occurred without it, or there would 
be no liability at all. 
"It was in a case of this type that the Minnesota 
Court applied a broader rule, which has found gen-
eral acceptance: The defendant's conduct is a cause 
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of the event if it was a material element and a sub-
stantial factor in bringing it about. Whether it was 
such a substantial factor is for the jury to determine, 
unless the issue is so clear that reasonable men could 
not differ. "Substantial factor" is a phrase suf-
ficiently intelligible to the layman to furnish an ade-
quate guide in instructions to the jury, and it is neither 
possible nor desirable to reduce it to lower terms. As 
applied to the fact of causation alone, no better test 
has been devised. 
"If the defendant's conduct was a substanlial fac-
tor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it follows that 
he will not be absolved from responsibility merely 
because other causes have contributed to the result. 
Nothing occurs in a vacuum, and the event withoul 
m.ultiple causes, numbered in the thousands, is incon-
ceivable. In particular, the defendant is not neces-
sarily relieved of liability because the negligence of 
another person is also a contributing cause. Thus 
where two vehicles collide and injure a bystander, or 
a passenger in one of them, each driver may be liable 
for the harm inflicted. The law of joint tortfeasors 
rests largely upon recognition of the fact that each 
of two causes may be charged with a single result. 
*** 
"PROOF: 
"On the issue of the fact of causation, as on 
other issues essential to his case, the plaintiff has the 
burden of proof. He must introduce evidence which 
affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it 
is more likely than not that the conduct of the de-
fendant was a substantial factor in the result. * * * 
"The plaintiff is not, however, required to prove 
his case beyond a reasonable doubt. He need not 
negative entirely the possibility that the defendant's 
conduct was not a cause, and it is enough that he in-
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traduces evidence from which reasonable men may 
conclude that it is more probable that the event was 
caused by the defendant than that it was not. The fact 
of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since 
no man can say with absolute certainty what would 
have occurred if the defendant had acted otherwise. 
Proof of what we call the relation of cause and ef-
fect, that of necessary antecedent and inevitable con-
sequence, can be nothing more than the "projection 
of our habit of expecting certain consequents to follow 
oertain antecedents merely because we had observed 
these sequences on previous occasions." If as a matter 
of ordinary experience a particular act or omission 
might be expected, under the circumstances, to pro-
duce a particular result, and that result in fact has 
followed, the conclusion may be permissible that the 
causal relation exists. 
"Circumstantial evidence or common knowledge 
may provide a basis from which the causal sequence 
may be inferred. Thus it is every day experience 
that unlighted stairs create a danger that someone will 
fall. Such a condition "greatly multiplies the chances 
of accident, and is of a character naturally leading to 
its occurrence .. " When a fat woman tumbles down the 
steps, it is a reasonable conclusion that it is more like-
ly than not that the bad lighting has played a substan-
tial part in the fall. When a child is drowned in a 
swimming pool, no one can say with certainty that a 
lifeguard would have saved him but the experience 
of the community permits the conclusion that the ab-
sence of the guard played a significant part in the 
drowning. SUCH QUESTIONS ARE PECULIAR-
LY FOR THE JURY; AND WHETHER PROPER 
CONSTRUCTION OF A BUILD~ING WOULD HAVE 
WITHSTOOD AN EARTHQUAKE, OR WHETHER 
REASONABLIE POLICE PRECAUTIONS WOULD 
HAVE PREVENTED A BOY FROM SHOOTING 
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THE PLAINTIFF IN THE EYE WITH AN AIR-
GUN., ARE QUESTIONS ON WHICH A COURT 
CAN; SELDOM RULE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
(Prosser on Torts, 2nd Ed. p. 532-536) : 
"Representation and Nondisclosure: 
"The representation which serves as the founda-
tion for an action of deceit may consist of words or 
conduct. Any active concealment of the truth, by 
words or conduct creating a false impression or re-
moving an opportunity to discover the facts, is treated 
as the equivalent of a representation that such facts 
are not true. 
"It is commonly stated as a general rule that 
deceit will not lie for mere silence, or passive nondis-
closure. To this rule a number of poorly defined 
exceptions have been developed, particularly where 
the parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary 
relation, or the contract is one which is regarded as 
requiring the utmost good faith. There is a tendency 
on the part of some courts to require disclosure in 
-any case where the defendant has special information 
not available to the plaintiff, and fair conduct de-
mands it. 
"Equitable relief, or estoppel, also usually is 
held to be available for nondisclosure of basic facts. 
"The representation which will serve as a basis 
for an action of deceit, as well as other forms of re-
lief, usually consists, of course, of oral or written 
words; but it is not necessarily so limited, and the 
exhibition of a document, turning back the speedo-
meter of an automobile offered for sale, drawing a 
check without funds, or a wide variety of other con-
duct calculated to convey a misleading impression 
under the circumstances of the case, may be suffici-
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ent. Here, as elsewhere, "actions may speak louder 
than words." 
"The significance to be assigned to such words 
or conduct will be determined according to the effect 
they would produce, under the circumstances, upon 
the ordinary mind. * * * 
"In addition to such representations by word 
or conduct, which might be called definite or posi-
tive, deceit, as well as other remedies, may be based 
upon an active concealment of the truth. Any words 
or acts which create a false impression covering up 
the truth, or which remove an opportunity that might 
otherwise have led to the discovery of a material fact 
-as by floating a ship to conceal the 'defects in her 
bottom, sending one who is in search of information 
in a direction where it cannot be obtained, or even a 
false denial of know ledge by one in possession of the 
facts--are classed as misrepresentation, no less than 
a verbal assurance that the fact is not true. 
"Nondisclosure: 
"A much more difficult problem arise~ as to 
whether mere silence, or a passive failure to disclose 
facts of which the defendant has knowledge, can 
serve as the foundation of a deceit action. It has 
commonly been stated as a general rule, particularly 
in the older cases, that the action will not lie for such 
tacit nondisclosure. * * * 
"To this general rule, if such it be, the courts 
have developed a number of exceptions, some of 
which ar.e as yet very ill defined, and have no very 
definite boundaries. The most obvious one is that if 
the defendant does speak, he must disclose enough 
to prevent his words from being misleading, * * * 
"Another exception is found where the parties 
stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation to one 
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another, such as that of principal and agent, executor 
and beneficiary of an estate, bank and investing de-
positor, or numerous others where special trust and 
confidence is reposed. In addition, certain types of 
contracts, such as those of suretyship or guaranty, 
insurance, partnership and joint adventure, are recog-
nized as creating something in the nature of a con-
fidential relation, and hence as requiring the utmost 
good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material 
facts. 
"* * *In a number of recent decisions, however, 
the same duty of disclosure has been found in other 
types of transactions where one party remains silent 
as to a fact which he knows to be of importance to the 
other. The law appears to be working toward the 
ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material 
facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct 
demands it. 
"When the plaintiff seeks relief of an equitabk 
character, as by rescission of the transaction and 
recovery of what he has parted with, a more liberal 
rule usually is applied. * * * The greater liberality 
found as to such remedies is probably due to the fact 
that they are primarily concerned with preventing the 
defendant from obtaining an unfair advantage of his 
own, while the action of deceit requires him to go 
further, and compensate the plaintiff for the loss he 
has sustained." 
Prosser quotes the case of BRASHER V. FIRST NA-
TIONAL BANK (1936) 232 Ala 3480, 168 So. 42. Also, 
the case of EDWARD BARRON ESTATE CO. vs. WOOD-
RUFF CO. (1912) 163 Cal 561, 126 P 351, 42 LRA NS 
125. This latter case cites the following relationships where 
special trust and confidence reposed: 
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"* * * for instance, the relations of trustee and 
cetui que trust, principal and agent, attorney and 
client, physician and patient, priest and parishioner, 
partners, tenants in common, husband and wife, par-
ent and child, guardian and ward, and many others 
of like character." 
The following excerpts from the Brasher case are perti-
"Where a relation of trust and confidence exists 
between the parties it is the duty of the party in whom 
the confidence is repos,ed to make full disclosure of 
all material facts within his knowledge relating to 
the transaction in question and any concealment of 
material fact by him is a fraud." ( 232 Ala 340 at 
page 344) 
12 RCL 311. 45 AM REP 75, reads: 
"Where confidential or fiduciary relations exist, 
which afford the power and means to one party to a 
transaction to take undue advantage of the other party 
and there is found the slightest trace of undue influ-
ence or unfair advantage, redress will be given to the 
injured party." 
12 RCL p. 305, par. 66: 
"Fraud may be committed by the suppression of 
truth as well as by the suggestion of falsehood and it 
is equally competent for the court to relieve against 
it whether it is committed in one way or the other. 
The one acts negatively, the other positively; both are 
calculated, in different ways, to produce the same 
results." 
215 Ala 200, 110 So. 286: 
"Courts of Justice will not look for naked technicali-
ties and mere sentimentalism as to shield one who by 
his fraud and deceit inflicts damage on another." 
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(Prosser on Torts, 2nd Ed. p. 566-671): 
"D .. amages: 
"Proof of damage is essential in an action of 
deceit. The damages recoverable are limited to those 
which might foreseeably be expected to follow from 
the character of the misrepresentation. The better 
view is that damage is not essential to restitution, in 
equity or at law, but that it is merely one factor to be 
considered in determining whether equitable relief 
should be granted. 
· "The . courts are divided as to two measures of 
damages in a deceit action. The majority adopt the 
"loss-of-bargain" rule, which gives the plaintiff the 
difference between the value of what he has received 
and the value he would have received if the represen-
tation had been true. The minority adopt the "out-of-
pocket" rule, which gives him the difference between 
the value received and the value he has parted with. 
There is a tendency toward a flexible rule, adopting 
either measure as the justice of the particular case 
may requlre. 
* * * 
"Furthermore, the damage upon which a deceit 
action rests must have been "proximately caused" by 
the misrepresentation. So far as the fact of causation 
is concerned, any loss which follows upon a transac-
tion into which the misstatement induces the plaintiff 
to enter may be said to be caused by it; * * * 
"When restitution is sought, either in equity or 
at law, a much more liberal policy has been adopted. 
Since the purpose is not to compensate the plaintiff's 
loss, but to restore what the defendant has received, 
the courts look to the inequity of allowing him to 
retain it, rather than to the damage which the plain-
. tiff has sustained. It is often repeated that damage 
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must be shown for rescission, and recovery has been 
denied on that ,basis; but the assertion is so far hon-
ored in the br~each that it has little or no validity.-
(Prosser quotes Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 
pars. 4 7 6 (c) and 4 77, which read as follows: (par. 
476 (c): "No legal effect is caused by either fraudu-
lent or other misrepresentation unless it induces af-
firmative or negative conduct, but it is not necessary 
that misrepresentation should be the only inducement 
for entering into a contract or for giving a discharge, 
voidable. It is enough that the misrepres~entation is 
relied on as an inducement. It is immaterial whether 
damage is caused." 
(par. 477): "Fraud or material misrepresentation 
by a third person renders a transaction voidable 
by a party induced thereby to enter into it if the other 
party thereto has reason to know of the fraud or 
misrepresentation before he has given or promised 
in good faith something of value in the transaction 
or changed his position materially by reason of the 
transaction." See 48 Harv. L. Rev. 480. 
(Prosser cont'd "Damages" p. 567): 
"The plaintiff will not be permitted to rescind where 
he has received substantially what he has bargained 
for, or where subsequent events have made the repre-
sentation good. But sufficient "damage" has been 
found, or dispensed with, where the plaintiff has 
received property of a different character or condi-
tion than he has promised, although· oJ equal value, 
where the transaction proves to be less advantageous 
than as represented, although there is no actual loss; 
and where the false statement was important to the 
plaintiff for reasons personal to himself, not affect-
ing any financial value or profit. It seems corr,ect to 
say rather that damage is not essential to rescission, 
but that it is merely one factor to be considered in 
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determining whether it is •equitable to allow the trans-
action to stand. 
"Measure of Damages: 
"The proximity of other forms of relief has been 
reflected in the conflicting rules which have been 
adopted as to the normal measure of damages in the 
action of deceit. The American courts are divided 
over two standards of measurement. One of these, 
the so-called "out -of-pocket" rule, looks to the loss 
which the plaintiff has suffered in the transaction, 
and gives him the difference between the value of 
what he as parted with and the value of what he has 
received. If what he received was worth what he 
paid for it, he has not been damaged, and there can 
be no recovery. This rule is followed in deceit ac-
tions by the English courts, and by a minority of per-
haps a dozen American jurisdictions. It is always 
adopted as to a defense in the nature of recoupment, 
and is of course the practical result reached by rescis-
sion where each party is restored to his original posi-
tion. The other measurement, called the "loss-of-
bargain" rule, gives the plaintiff the benefit of what 
he was promised, and allows recovery of the differ-
ence between the actual value of what he has received 
and the value that it would have had if it had been 
as represented. This, of course, is the rule applied 
in contract actions for breach of warranty, and it is 
consistent with the result in cases of estoppel. It has 
been adopted by some two-thirds of the courts which 
have considered the question in actions of deceit. 
There is the same conflict where the recovery is 
based on negligent misrepresentation. 
"As a matter of the strict logic of the form of 
action, the first of these two rules is more consistent 
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with the purpose of tort remedies, which is to com-
pensate the plaintiff for a loss sustained, rather than 
to give him the benefit of any contract bargain. Also, 
it must of necessity be adopted where the defendant 
is a third party who has made no contract with the 
plaintiff, and it has been contended that the presence 
of a contract should not change the damages where 
the action is not on the contract itself. On the other 
hand, it is urged in support of the majority rule that 
the form of the action should be of little importance, 
that in an action in the form of tort for breach of 
warranty the plaintiff is given the benefit of his bar-
gain and the addition of an allegation of intent to 
deceive should certainly not decrease his recovery, 
and that in many cases the out-of-pocket measure will 
permit the fraudulent defendant to escape all liability 
and have a chance to profit by the transaction if he 
can get away with it. 
"Few courts have followed either rule with en-
tire consistency, and various proposals have been 
made to introduce some flexibility into the measure 
of damages. Thus it has been suggested that the loss-
of-bargain rule should be applied in cases of inten-
tional misrepresentation, the out-of-pocket rule where 
it is innocent; that the plaintiff be given the option 
of either rule, or that the court should adopt the rule 
which best fits the certainty of the damages proved, 
and so avoid the possibility that a plaintiff who has 
suffered a real damage may be denied recovery be-
cause he is unable to prove values. A leading Oregon 
decision (Selman vs. Shirley, 1938, 161 Or. 582, 85 
P 2d 384, 91 P 2d 312, 124 ALR I), which seems 
to have given more careful consideration to the 
problem than any other, and is beginning to be fol-
lowed in other jurisdictions, reduces the matter to four 
rules, as follows: 
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"1. If the defrauded party is content with the 
recovery of only the amount he has actually lost, his 
damages will alw,ays be measured under that rule. 
"2. If the fraudulent transaction also amounted 
to a warranty, he may recover for loss of the bar-
gain, because a fraud accompanied by a broken prom-
ise should cost the wrong-doer as much as the breach 
of promise alone. 
"3. Where the circumstances disclosed by the 
proof are so vague as to cast virtually no light upon 
the value of the property had it conformed to the 
representations, damages will be awarded equal to the 
loss sustained, and 
"4. Where the daTTUlges uruier the benefit-of-
bargain rule are proved with reasonable certainty, 
that rule will be employed. 
"* * *If the deception is found to have been 
deliberate or wanton, punitive damages may be re-
covered, as in the case of other torts of similar char-
acter." 
The treatment of deceit and fraud is exhaustively gone 
into in V ols. 23 and 24, American Juris prudence, under 
the title "What Constitutes Damage; Time of Accrual." This 
authority cites on page 994, Vol. 23, par. 175, the following: 
"Although proof of a material injury is essential 
in an action of deceit, the loss or injury need not be 
of a specifically pecuniary character. It is sufficienl 
if the fraud has resulted in the loss of a right which 
the law recognizes as of pecuniary value, * * * 
The mere difficulty of estimation of injury, or that 
the right is personal, does not bar recovery." 
In support of this proposition American Jurisprudence 
cites the case of KUJEK V. GOLDMAN, 150 NY 176, 44 
NE 773: 
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"1. A man who induces another to marry a girl 
by false representations that she is virtuous when in 
fact she has been seduced by himself and has become 
pregnant is liable for damages in an action by the 
husband for fraud. 
"2. Exemplary damages are recoverable for fraud 
in inducing a man to marry a woman who is pregnant 
by another. 
"3. A direct precedent for the action is not neces-
sary to give a right of action for the wrong. 
"4. Loss of the comfort founded upon affection 
and respect derived from conjugal society is suffici-
ent, irrespective of any pecuniary damages, to sus-
tain an action by a husband against one who has 
fraudulently induced him to marry a woman who 
is pregnant by another." 
The court said: "While no precendent is cited for 
such an action, it does not follow that there is no rem-
edy for the wrong, because every form of action when 
brought for the first time must have been without a 
precedent to support it. Courts sometimes of neces-
sity abandon their search for precedents and yet sus-
tain a recovery upon legal principles clearly applic-
able to the new state of facts, although there was no 
direct precedent for it, because there had never been 
an occasion to make one." 
American Jurisprudence quotes the following princi-
ples which are pertinent to the issues in the instant case: 
{Vol 23) 
Par. 175, p. 994: 
"One who is defrauded through false representations 
respecting the solvency of another is damnified as 
soon as he is induced to act in the manner occasion-
ing the loss, and may maintain an action therefor at 
once.'' 
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Par. 179, p. 998: 
"Dispensability of Benefit to, or Interest of, Wrong-
doer.-lt is well settled that in order to render one 
liable for damages in an action of deceit, it is not 
necessary that he shall have derived any benefit from 
the deception or have colluded with the person who 
was so benefited. Nor is it necessary, in order to 
established remediable damage, that the person charg-
ed with fraud shall have had any interest in the 
contemplated transaction, or in the subject matter 
thereof, or in making the representation, or that he 
shall have expected to reap any benefit from the 
fraud. The fact that he happens to have such an in-
terest is a matter of which the law takes no cog-
nizance in such an action. It is not necessary to 
allege or prove it; and proof of it does not affect 
the rights of the parties, unless it goes far enough to 
create a liability of another kind, although the fact 
that he did derive a benefit may serve to strengthen 
the plaintiff's case on the evidence." 
Par. 187, p. 1011: 
"Third Persons Not parties to Transaction.-A per-
son may be charged with fraud, although he is not a 
party to the transaction into which the complainant 
is induced, by the misrepresentation, to enter. To 
render one liable in an action of deceit, no privity of 
contract between the plaintiff and defendant need be 
shown, the character of repres;entee being sufficient." 
See the following cases: 
PICHE V. ROBBINS, 24 RI 325, 53 ATL 92, 28 LRA 
(NS) 205. The Court in this case said: 
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"If the vendor of property in selling same, asserts 
that the property is unencumbered, which statement 
is untrue, although he believes it to be true, he is 
nevertheless liable to the vendee in an action for 
deceit." 
CARPENTER V. WRIGHT, 52 KAN 221,311 Pac 798: 
"The fact that a person who makes a fraudulent 
representation had no personal interest in the sale of 
real estate, the title of which he misrepresented, and 
that he received no portion of the purchase price, does 
not relieve him from liability to the vendee where the 
latter relied upon the representation." 
HOTALING Vs. A. B. LEACH CO. (1928) 247 NY 
84, 159 NE 870. The Court in this case held: 
"The loss proximately caused by the defendants' 
fraud is the difference between the price he paid and 
the value of what he received when put to the use 
contemplated by the parties." 
In the case of HECHT V. METZLER (1897) 14 Utah 
408, 48 P 37, 60 Am St Rep 906, the court stated: 
"In an action for fraud and deceit in the sale or 
exchange of property, the measure of damages is 
the difference between the actual value of the prop-
erty as it would have been if as represented and as it 
actually was." 
In summary, the undisputed facts as hereinabove set 
forth, clearly disclose that the defendants entered into a 
conspiracy with one Waldo Jackson, the operator of the 
Jackson Sales & Service Co., to obtain $10,000 in cash 
from plaintiffs to apply on the chattel mortgage indebted-
ness of Waldo Jackson and Jackson Sales & Service Co. to 
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the defendant Springville Banking Co. The application of 
the basic principles of law of fraud and deceit as hereinabove 
set forth to the factual picture of this conspiracy clearly 
justifies the court in reversing the decision of the lower court 
in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plain-
tiffs contend that the misconduct of defendants in failing to 
disclose to plaintiffs the said mortgage lien against the stock 
and equipment transferred to the Stockman & Farmers 
Mart at its very inception, coupled with the defendants 
maliciously false representations as to the financial stability 
and capital structure of said corporation, as more particu-
larly hereinabove set forth, not only caused plaintiffs to 
suffer damages in the sum of $,10,000 but it was also the 
basic cause of the insolvency of the Stockman & Farmers 
Mart. It is well to keep in mind that under the law of 
fraud and deceit it is only necessary for the plaintiffs 
to show that the misconduct of the defendants was one of 
the basic causes of plaintiffs' damage. It may be argued 
there were other contributory causes, but the factual picture 
now before the court does not disclose any other factors for 
the insolvency of the Stockman & Farmers Mart and the 
resultant damage to plaintiffs in the sum of $10,000. We 
reiterate the rule laid down by William L. Prosser in his 
Law of Torts as found on pages 18 and 19 of this brief: 
"The plaintiff is not, however, required to prove 
his case beyond a reasonable doubt. He need not nega-
tive entirely the possibility that the defendant's con-
duct was not a cause, and it is enough that he intro-
duces evidence from which reasonable men may con-
clude that it is more probable that the event was 
caused by the defendant than it was not. The fact 
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of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, 
since no man can say with absolute certainty what 
would have occurred if the defendant had acted other-
wise. Proof of what we call the relation of cause and 
effect, that of necessary antecedent and inevitable 
consequence, can be nothing more than the 'projec-
tion of our habit of expecting certain consequents to 
follow certain antecedents merely because we had 
observed these sequences on plievious occasions.' If 
as a matter of ordinary experience a particular act 
or omission might be expected, under the circum-
stances, to produce a particular result, and that result 
in fact has followed, the conclusion may be permis-
sible that the causal relation exists." 
Certainly a person of ordinary experience would con-
clude that the misconduct of defendants resulted in the in-
solvency of the said corporation and the damage to plain-
tiffs in the sum of $10,000. In the first place, the proposed 
corporation was to have an unencumbered inventory of stock 
and equipment of the reasonable value of approximately 
$26,500. As a matter of fact there was a chattel mortgage 
outstanding against these assets in the sum of $45,000 with 
an unpaid balance of $41,194.79. According to the mis-
representations of the defendants, these assets were free and 
clear of encumbrances except the sum of $6,500, which sum 
said corporation borrowed from the defendant bank to dis-
charge obligations of creditors of Jackson Sales & Service 
Co. Defendant Maycock testified this $6,500 was the total 
obligations against these assets. This was a maliciously 
false statement as there was an outstanding mortgage in-
debtedness of some $41,194.79. From these facts any or-
dinary person would say that the company was insolvent 
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from its very inception. The Defendant Maycock also testi~ 
fied .that- the :$10;000 which plaintiffs were putting into the 
business wits to ·pay for their stock in the corporation; that 
this would give the 'corporation $10,000 in capital to operate 
the company. Maycock testified: "We felt an additional 
$10,000 in -the business wottld make it a better business and 
it would: also -give a new· personality to it." ( R. 42) This 
statement is also false. ·Under the conspiracy of the de~ 
fendants, the $10,000 was ·transferred immediately on the 
date of its reception to the defendant bank. There was 
also a statement made by Defendant Maycock that $10,000 
was being 'put into . the business by Waldo Jackson. These 
representations were all made when this corporation was 
finally brought into being on March 2, 1955. This state-
ment was false as shown by the sworn testimony of Waldo 
Jackson in his deposition as hereinabove set forth. (R. 47-
48) So instead of having a capital of $20,000 this com-
pany had absolutely no capital at all, as the $6,500 which 
they borrowed was solely for the purpose of discharging 
obligations of the creditors of Jackson Sales & Service Co~ 
The· facts show that this amount was paid to these creditors. 
From the beginning this corporation has $26,500 of stock 
and equipment subject to a mortgage indebtedness of $41,· 
194.79 and note of $6,500 owing to defendant Springville 
Banking Co. Certainly no one would loan any money for 
working capital on assets ·which were encumbered with liens 
far in excess of their value. Is it any wonder that on or 
about May of 1955 approximately two months after the 
organization of this corporation the defendants put the 
pressure on Waldo Jackson and plaintiffs to sell the inven· 
tory and assets of the Stockman & Farmers Mart in order 
that the $6,500 obligation to the bank could be liquidated. 
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Finally on or about September of 1955 at the instance and 
demand of defendants, Stockman & Farmers Mart did ex-
change its assets for a farm at Payson, Utah, owned by one 
E. A. Smithurst, which farm was subject to a mortgage in 
the approximate sum of .$6,751.23. The facts show that 
defendant bank presided throughout this Smithurst transac-
tion. Then to complete the financial capitulation of this 
company, the defendants demanded that the farm be sold 
to John T. Martin and after the mortgage was paid on the 
farm, the net proceeds of $4,300 was paid to said defendant 
bank upon said $6,500 loan. Applying Prosser's test of 
causation, no sane person could possibly arrive at any con-
clusion other than that the misconduct of the defendants 
was not only a basic cause of the insolvency of the Stockman 
& Farmers Mart, but was the basic cause of said insolvency. 
Certainly the misconduct of defendants was cleraly and defi-
nitely a basic cause and in the opinion of any reasonable per-
son the basic cause of the damage suffered by plaintiffs in the 
sum of $10,000. The cases of Hotaling vs. A. B. Leach Co. 
and Hecht vs. Metzler, hereinabove quoted, lay down the 
rule "that the loss proximately caused by defendant's fraud 
is the difference between the price he paid and the value of 
what he received when put to the use contemplated by the 
parties." If the representations by defendants had been true 
and the Stockman & Farmers Mart had enjoyed the capital 
structure incident to these representations, the dire con-
sequences that befell this corporation would never have 
occurred and plaintiffs would not have suffered damages in 
the sum of $10,000 or any other sum. 
Furthermore, no sane person would have invested 
$10,000 in such an enterprise if defendants had disclosed 
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to plaintiffs that defendant hank had a $41,194.79 mort-
gage encumbrance against · the total inventory assets of 
$26,500. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & McCULLOUGH 
By: R. Verne McCullough 
Partner 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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